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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
i) In recent years a number of high-profile company failures, including those at BHS 
and Carillion, have raised fundamental ques4ons about the willingness and/or 
ability of auditors to challenge management and exercise the professional 
scep4cism necessary for the produc4on of robust audits.  
ii) Ques4ons of public accountability are at the heart of audit failures. The purpose 
of an audit is to verify that financial statements produced by a company’s 
management present a “true and fair view” of a company or group’s assets, 
liabili4es, financial posi4on and profit or loss (Companies Act 2006, sec4on 393). 
We are all affected when that mission fails: confidence in companies disappears - 
banks will not lend, shareholders will not invest, workers will not commit their 
labour, suppliers will not transact and consumers will not buy.  
iii) This report is the outcome of a two-month study which analyses why audits are 
failing their wider public purpose. Our study draws on four main sources: i) a 
review of relevant academic and policy literature on audit failure, ii) fourteen 
interviews with prominent figures in media, regula4on, academia, civil society 
and industry with extensive knowledge of audit failure issues, iii) an examina4on 
of primary and secondary data on audit failure and iv) a social network analysis of 
other campaigning organisa4ons as a model for how civil society might organise 
and respond to audit failure in the future. 
iv) Our public accountability approach began with the following understanding of 
the problem: 
¥ Accoun4ng constructs, rather than merely reflects, a financial reality: it is thus 
prone to manipula4on. 
¥ Audi4ng is a check on manipula4on and so should be understood as a social 
u4lity: it performs a vital check on accoun4ng abuse for the benefit of all 
stakeholders. 
¥ There is thus a need to address the ‘accountability gap’: the shoraall between 
what the wider public might legi4mately expect auditors to do and what the 
audit process currently delivers. 
v) Analy4cally, we approach audit failure as the outcome of a par4cular 
configura4on of economic, cultural, regulatory arrangements which create the 
opportunity spaces within which audit failures take place. The causes of audit 
failure therefore must be understood in organisa4onal, ins4tu4onal and historical 
context. Our emphasis, therefore, is on the rela%ons and interac%ons which lead 
to audit failures. 
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vi) Our findings are that: 
¥ The interac4on of i) shareholder value linked remunera4on structures for senior 
managers, ii) fair value accoun4ng standards where valua4ons require some 
subjec4ve judgement on the part of those managers and iii) IFRS rules which 
encourage proceduralism over judgement create large opportunity spaces for 
audit failure. They provide senior managers with the incen4ve and the means to 
produce op4mis4c valua4ons, whilst the proceduralism of IFRS rules create an 
ambiguity as to where rules end and judgement begins for auditors, which 
reduces their incen4ve to challenge. 
¥ Similarly, the interac4on of US fair value rules which are formal and procedural 
and a UK regulatory system more accustomed to informal, trust-based, qualita4ve 
forms of governance leads to role ambiguity and a more conciliatory regime 
which defers to management. 
¥ The cultures and prac4ces which lead to audit failure long predate the current 
compe44ve environment where the Big Four dominate. A focus on compe44on 
to the exclusion of all other reform op4ons ignores the documented experiences 
when there were five or even eight large audit firms. The problems are 
ins4tu4onal and cultural rather than market-based. 
¥ Different cultures may co-exist within the same organisa4on without one 
imposing on the other. However, the ins4tu4onal logics which underpin the 
culture of consul4ng are incompa4ble with those of audi4ng. This leaves auditors 
compromised when they should feel free to exercise scep4cism fearlessly. 
¥ These problems are exacerbated by the partnership system in the Big Four which 
may promote non-audit services in ways that compromise audit quality. 
¥ However historic adempts to reform the audit industry have disappointed 
because reformists confront a ‘thin poli4cal market’ (Ramanna 2015): the audit 
reform process is captured by the interests of the audi4ng industry because they 
possess tacit, technical knowledge in a context where audit is of low poli4cal 
salience amongst the general public.  
vii) Our recommenda4ons are: 
¥ In order to reassert the proper role of audit prac4ce, the accoun4ng framework 
should be amended to reinforce the 2006 Companies Act. It should be stated in 
that framework that accoun4ng rules are subordinate to law, and that the role of 
audi4ng is to exercise pruden4al judgement to priori4se capital maintenance. 
¥ In order to reinvigorate a culture of scep4cism and prudence, we recommend 
that audit and non-audit ac4vi4es are legally separated, that limited liability 
privileges should be withdrawn from both audit and non-audit services to reduce 
moral hazard and that the FRC should be replaced with the Kingman Review 
recommended Audit, Repor4ng and Governance Authority (ARGA).  
¥ In order to shrink the opportunity spaces where scep4cism is compromised, we 
recommend a government review into the role of fair value accoun4ng rules in 
audit failure. Specifically, whether IFRS rules – with their combina4on of 
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subjec4vity and proceduralism - create an ambiguity as to where rules end and 
judgement begins for auditors. 
¥ Finally, in order to address the ‘thin poli4cal market’ problem, we recommend 
the inclusion of civil society representa4ves in key regulatory bodies and bodies 
involved in the audit reform process. Furthermore, we see a role for civil society 
bodies in crea4ng new networked alliances between academics, public 
intellectuals and seasoned campaigners to ‘thicken’ the thin poli4cal market, and 
build an effec4ve civil society check on audit failure.  
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1. Introduc%on 
1.1 The purpose of an audit should be to verify that financial statements produced by a 
company’s management provide a “true and fair view” of a company or group’s assets, 
liabili4es, financial posi4on and profit or loss (Companies Act 2006, sec4on 393).  
1.2 Without robust audits, confidence in companies disappears - banks will not lend, 
shareholders will not invest, workers will not commit their labour, suppliers will not transact 
and consumers will not buy.  
1.3 In recent years a number of high-profile company failures have undermined taken-for-
granted trust. The collapse of companies like Carillion and Bri4sh Home Stores raise 
fundamental ques4ons about the willingness and/or ability of auditors to challenge 
management and exercise the professional scep4cism which is essen4al to the produc4on of 
robust, socially-useful audits.  
1.4 These individual failures are reinforced by a reported slide in audit quality, as measured 
by the Financial Repor4ng Council (FRC) annual review of audit quality. In 2018 the FRC 
found that just under three-quarters of FTSE 350 audits were either ‘good’ or ‘needed only 
trivial improvements’, implying a full quarter of audits in some of the UK’s largest firms 
required more extensive improvements (Ford & Burgess 2019).  
1.5 In response to these individual and aggregate failings, the Government commissioned 
two independent reviews: the Kingman Review to look at regula4on and the Brydon Review 
to examine the effec4veness of audit. At the same 4me the Compe44on and Markets 
Authority (CMA) examined compe44on and resilience in the audit sector. The Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy Commidee’s analysis, ‘The Future of Audit’ fed into these 
reports. Collec4vely these reports raise ques4ons about audit culture, the problems of 
market concentra4on in audi4ng services and conflicts of interest inside the Big Four 
accoun4ng firms (BEIS 2018, 2019; Compe44on & Markets Authority 2019 (CMA); Kingman 
Review 2019). 
1.6 The purpose of this report is to build on this appe4te for reform by offering a perspec4ve 
that differs in scope in two fundamental respects:  
1.6.1 Our focus is on the public accountability of audi4ng as a professional prac4ce:  
i. We view audi4ng as a social u%lity that builds trust and legi4macy in firms and 
organisa4ons. This trust is essen4al for all stakeholders: creditors, shareholders, 
workers, suppliers, consumers and the state. Without confidence in a firm’s 
accoun4ng outputs, creditors will not lend, shareholders will not invest, workers 
may seek alterna4ve employment, suppliers may withdraw their services and 
consumers may switch to more credible suppliers.  
ii. We consequently focus on the accountability gap - the shoraall between what 
the wider public might legi4mately expect auditors to do and what the audit 
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process currently delivers. This is dis4nct from the more tradi4onal ‘expecta4on 
gap’ explana4on that emphasises differences between what the public thinks 
auditors do and what their actual responsibili4es are (ACCA, 2019). Too olen the 
lader defaults onto a discussion about the public’s lack of knowledge rather than 
the behaviours of the audit profession. The accountability gap frame asks: if 
audit is failing its wider public purpose, what interven4ons are needed to restore 
its social u4lity func4on?  
1.6.2 Our focus is also on the public accountability of the audit reform process. The 
history of audit reform is lidered with good inten4ons that do not translate into 
effec4ve checks on bad prac4ce. Reform failure is partly the result of asking the wrong 
ques4ons, designing the wrong policies or failing to implement or properly enforce 
new rules aler the process has ended. We understand the audit market, following 
Ramanna (2015) as a ‘thin poli4cal market’ open to insider capture in ways that 
frustrate reform. Consequently, this report will examine how to build a stronger civil 
society presence in the reform process, to speak for the interests of the wider public 
and prevent regulatory capture.  
1.7 Our four terms of reference therefore are to: 
1.7.1 examine the extent and form of audit failure in context    
1.7.2 understand the causes of those failures, drawing on the concept of ‘opportunity 
spaces’ (defined in 1.8) 
1.7.3 locate explana4ons of failure within the context of the growth of the Big Four 
accoun4ng firms 
1.7.4 trace the historical obstacles to reform in audit services and to consider the social 
forces/poli4cal agents best placed to advance public accountability reform processes 
and audit prac4ces 
1.8 By addressing these four ques4ons, we aim to beder understand the ‘opportunity 
spaces’ which lead to audit failures. We define an opportunity space as: 
the room for manoeuvre within a valua%on process, where opportuni%es to 
overstate accoun%ng items are taken because auditor judgement is compromised or 
constrained, leading to informa%on asymmetries between the ac%ng party or 
par%es and those seeking accoun%ng accuracy and accountability. 
1.9 We view opportunity spaces as arising primarily from financial, organisa4onal or 
ins4tu4onal rela4ons which produce incen4ves that compromise or frustrate auditors' ability 
to exercise pruden4al judgement.  Our recommenda4ons therefore focus on a series of 
interlocking, mutually-reinforcing ins4tu4onal measures designed to shrink opportunity 
spaces, empower auditor independence, reinvigorate prudence and restore the professional 
status of auditors as the policemen and policewomen of capital.  
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2. Evidence of audit failure  
2.1 Good quality audits are integral to the smooth opera4on of any modern economy. Firms 
can expect dire consequences if the perceived legi4macy and quality of reported financial 
numbers falters. However, audi4ng confronts a problem. Accoun4ng is not a passive, 
technical process of mirroring or mapping some objec4ve financial reality that presents itself 
unambiguously. Accoun4ng is an uncertain valua4on process which requires judgements in a 
context where the applica4on of different principles or rules can lead to very different 
valua4on outputs. Accoun4ng, in this sense, cons%tutes and legi%mises a par4cular financial 
reality (Hines 1988; Robson 1992) and the task of audi4ng is to decide whether that process 
of construc4on provides a ‘true and fair’ representa4on of the underlying ac4vity of the firm 
in ques4on. 
2.2 Weak audits invite senior management to report the accoun4ng numbers that suit them, 
allowing firms to pay out dividends or hit performance targets which trigger board bonuses. 
At Carillion, for example, the company was found to have paid dividends out of 
‘op4mis4cally booked...unrealised profit’ (BEIS 2019, p.4) and maintained valua4ons of its 
goodwill which meant that 80% of its net present value derived from an assump4on that the 
cash flows Carillion expected to generate from its acquisi4ons would con4nue ‘in perpetuity’ 
(BEIS & DWP 2018, p.53).  
2.3 Yet, at the same 4me, the task of audi4ng has become ostensibly more difficult. 
Companies are now more global and subsidiarized. Audi4ng involves naviga4ng differences 
in interna4onal accoun4ng rules and repor4ng cultures in a context where the volume of 
data has increased significantly and deadlines have shortened (Interviewee 2). Accoun4ng 
rules have also introduced more subjec4vity into the valua4on of par4cular items such as 
contract revenues, goodwill and deriva4ves, which can make the task of iden4fying 
irregulari4es more challenging. Strong collec4ve commitments to forms of professional 
regula4on that empower such judgements have long-been established in the UK (Robson et 
al. 1994), but this has intensified in the past decade. The task of audi4ng may therefore have 
become more difficult at a 4me when it has never been more essen4al.  
2.4 Audit failure is now an important public interest issue, on a scale similar to that of the 
early/mid 2000s. This can partly be measured by the frequency of audit failure stories 
appearing in the Financial Times (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Frequency of audi%ng failure stories in the Financial Times, 1982-2019 
Source: FACTIVA Database · Note: search thread: “audit failure" or "accoun%ng scandal" or "failures in audit" or 
"audi%ng failures" or "audit failures" or "accoun%ng irregulari%es" or "audi%ng failure". 
2.5 The growing problem of audit failure is also reflected in the FRC's willingness to fine 
organisa4ons. As figure 2 shows the fines handed out by the FRC to auditors rose from £240k 
in 2011 to £15.5m in 2017. By July 2018 fines were already at £15.4m, £6.5m of which was a 
record fine for PWC’s audi4ng of BHS Ltd.  
Figure 2: Fines for misconduct and other audit failures, 2011-July 2018 
Source: FRC Developments In Audit Report, various years. 
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2.6 Fine dates do not necessarily coincide with the dates when audit failures originally took 
place. Fines are levied only upon the comple4on of misconduct cases which can take many 
months or even years. Without pre-emp4ng outcomes of ongoing cases, it is conceivable 
that this upward trend will con4nue, when the reviews of Carillion, Mi4e, Rolls Royce and 
the BT Group are concluded. 
  
2.7 Although there are historical examples of audit failure of similar magnitude in other 
countries (Toshiba in Japan, Parmalat in Italy, Carrefour in France), there is evidence to 
suggest that the frequency of large audit failures is currently higher in the UK than in other 
compara4vely sized economies. Whilst there is no central database of interna4onal audit 
failure that we are aware of, it is possible through frequency counts of audit failure stories in 
the Financial Times to provide an indica4ve picture of the geography of audit failure. The FT 
is a UK-based newspaper with some geographical bias to their repor4ng, but it is also a 
paper where both coverage and readership are global. The UK is also a much larger market 
for audit services than much of Europe - and so this may also explain why the UK is over-
represented in audit failure stories. A list of the 100 firms with the largest number of stories 
related to audit failure in the Financial Times is provided in the Appendix; no obvious non-UK 
omissions are evident to the authors. Figure 3 shows that more stories about audit failure 
are related to UK firms than any other country, whilst figure 4 shows that of the 40 
companies that have had the highest number of audit failure stories wriden about them, 15 
were UK based (16, if Royal Dutch Shell are included). This may indicate that audit quality 
problems are greater in the UK (and US) than elsewhere. Poten4al reasons for this will be 
discussed in later sec4ons.  
Figure 3: Frequency of stories about audit failure in the 
Financial Times, by country of origin of the company 
involved  
Source: FACTIVA Database · Note: search thread: “audit failure" or 
"accoun%ng scandal" or "failures in audit" or "audi%ng failures" or "audit 
failures" or "accoun%ng irregulari%es" or "audi%ng failure" 
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Region Document count
1 United Kingdom 1906
2 United States 1545
3 Netherlands 398
4 Japan 391
5 Germany 153
6 China 147
7 South Africa 136
8 France 123
9 Canada 109
10 Italy 100
Rest of the world 768
Figure 4: The 40 companies with the highest number of audit failure stories in the FT, 
by country of origin. 
Source: FACTIVA Database · Note: search thread: “audit failure" or "accoun%ng scandal" or "failures in audit" or 
"audi%ng failures" or "audit failures" or "accoun%ng irregulari%es" or "audi%ng failure" 
2.8 Before we consider causes of audit failure it is important to recognise that not all audit 
failures are the same. There are outright frauds which involve individuals syphoning money 
from a business, for example at Polly Peck Interna4onal in 1991 where the CEO Asil Nadir 
was eventually sentenced to ten years in prison for the thel of £29m (Box 1). There are 
situa4ons where audit firms (e.g. Enron [Box 2]) or individual auditors (e.g. Parmalat [Box 3]) 
have, either through complicity or negligence, allowed management to overstate profits/
assets or understate losses/liabili4es through the booking of false trades. In those cases, 
auditors are also at fault for facilita4ng or failing to constrain managers ac4ng in their own 
interests to the detriment of shareholders and other stakeholders. There are then examples 
where rules appear to have been followed, but measurements are incommensurable; and 
the outcome is thus undesirable from a public accountability perspec4ve (e.g. Goldman 
Sachs/AIG [Box 4]). In such circumstances accountability failures may lie with the interac4on 
of accoun4ng rules, organisa4onal incen4ves and ins4tu4onal factors which encourage weak 
audits or constrain auditors from exercising judgements which they might, under different 
circumstances, ordinarily make. Here auditor liability is less clear cut, even though outcomes 
must s4ll be understood as an accountability failure because the public interest has not been 
met. 
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BOX 1 
Who? 
Polly Peck, a diversified UK firm with interests in tex4les, 
packaging and electronics 
What Happened? 
Polly Peck was a small UK-based tex4le company which expanded 
rapidly through acquisi4on in the 1980s, but collapsed in 1991 
with debts of £1.3bn. Accused of fraud, the then CEO, Asil Nadir, 
fled from the UK to Northern Cyprus in 1993. He later returned to 
the UK in 2010. He was convicted in 2012 on seven counts of 
thel from his own company and sentenced to ten years in jail. 
How? 
From 1988, Nadir used fake transac4ons to boost revenues and 
profits. Up to £378m disappeared from the company in the form 
of loans, dubious transac4ons and the re-registra4on of Polly 
Peck’s assets under Nadir’s name (Partridge 2019). Nadir argued 
these loans were legi4mate and had been repaid. But the 
evidence presented in court suggested they were mainly used to 
prop up Polly Peck’s share price or were stolen by Nadir. Three 
accountants - Huseyin Erdal, Ahmet Ozdal and Firuz Fehmi - were 
found to have supplied audited figures to Stoy Hayward that 
"bore no rela4onship to reality". They were required to pay 
£125,000 towards the joint disciplinary scheme's costs (Treanor 
2003). Stoy Howard were fined £75,000 and ordered to pay 
£250,000 in costs for failing to check the suitability of the 
company’s secondary auditors Erdal & Co, and accep4ng 
unsubstan4ated explana4ons about sums held in the company’s 
subsidiary in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Perry 
2002). 
Type Of Audit Failure 
Collusion with corrupt management prac%ces: Erdal & Co were 
complicit in the fraud (Toms, 2017). 
References 
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BOX 2 
Who? 
Enron, an energy firm based in Houston, Texas, USA. 
What Happened? 
Enron diversified from being a simple energy pipeline business into 
a commodi4es and service trading opera4on. Throughout the 
1990s and early 2000s the company used a variety of accoun4ng 
mechanisms to inflate earnings and hide liabili4es. In 2001, Enron 
restated their earnings, repor4ng a $814m reduc4on in equity, a 
$628m increase in debt, and an addi4onal $591 million in losses. 
Enron entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy later that year. In 2006 
Enron’s CEO, Jeffrey Skilling was convicted of insider trading, fraud, 
and conspiracy; Kenneth Lay, Enron’s previous CEO, was convicted 
of six counts of fraud and conspiracy and four counts of bank 
fraud. In 2002, Enron’s auditor, Arthur Anderson, was convicted of 
negligence in its audi4ng and obstruc4on of jus4ce for shredding 
documents related to its audit of Enron. Anderson surrendered its 
CPA licenses and its right to prac4ce in August 2002, effec4vely 
pu{ng it out of business (Healy & Palepu 2003). Although the 
2002 decision was eventually overturned in 2005 due to errors in 
the original judge’s jury instruc4ons. Arthur Anderson sedled for 
$72.5m with Enron’s investors in 2007.  
How? 
Abuse of fair value accoun%ng rules to inflate profits: Mark to 
market methods were abused in the measurement of energy 
contracts and deriva4ves. For example, overly op4mis4c model 
based assump4ons were used to value Enron’s deriva4ves, whilst 
they also realised all expected profits in long term contracts in the 
present (Bradon 2002).  
Use of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to hide debt: Enron used off 
balance sheet shell companies capitalized en4rely by Enron stock 
to borrow money on Enron's behalf. By 2001, Enron had used 
hundreds of SPVs to hide its debt. 
Type Of Audit Failure 
Audit firm failure: failures were company wide 
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BOX 3 
Who? 
Parmalat: an Italian company, specialising in dairy and foods.  
What Happened? 
Between 1990-2003 Parmalat were involved in a mul4-faceted 
fraud involving mul4ple individuals. The fraud unravelled in 2003 
when an inves4ga4on by PWC uncovered a 14bn Euro black hole 
in its books, which led the company to collapse almost 
immediately. Primary auditor from 1999-2003, Deloide & Touche 
sedled for  $149m in 2007 for failing to pay aden4on to field 
auditors’ Early Warning Reports & Summary Audit Pleadings 
(Clikeman 2019). Primary auditor un4l 1999 and secondary 
auditor from 1999-2003, Grant Thornton Interna4onal were 
implicated in the fraud more directly. Grant Thornton expelled 
the Italian affiliate from their global network and auditors 
Mauricio Bianchi and Lorenzo Penca were charged in a Milan 
court for aiding the Parmalat fraud (Clikeman 2019). Grant 
Thornton eventually sedled with Parmalat for $4.4m without 
admi{ng liability (Parmalat 2015). 
How? 
Overstatement of revenues through a double billing scheme: 
accounts sold on credit to a supermarket; invoices were 
duplicated (typically in the name of the shipping company that 
delivered the milk) genera4ng fake sales. The duplicate invoices 
inflated revenues and created false receivables; the receivables 
were used as collateral which they pledged against new loans. 
The loans, then, boosted the cash posi4on of the company 
(Ferrarini & Giudici 2005). 
Hiding losses using off balance sheet wholly-owned en%%es: 
uncollec4ble receivables were transferred from opera4ng 
companies to nominee en44es like Cayman Islands subsidiary 
‘Bonlat’. Fic44ous trades/financial transac4ons were then 
constructed to offset losses of opera4ng subsidiaries and inflate 
assets & income. 
Understa%ng liabili%es: recorded non-existent bond repurchases; 
sold ‘non-recourse’ receivables to remove liabili4es; debt 
reported as equity; debt not reported at all. 
Audit failure type?  
Individual auditor failure - Bianchi & Penca, (then of Grant 
Thornton Interna4onal) 
References: 
Clikeman, P., 2019. Called to Account: Financial Frauds that 
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BOX 4 
Who? 
American Interna4onal Group (AIG) a US insurance company 
Goldman Sachs, a US investment bank 
What Happened? 
Throughout the mid 2000s Goldman Sachs bought insurance on 
the senior tranches of their sub-prime mortgage backed Collateral 
Debt Obliga4ons (CDOs) to add a layer of security (see Englen et 
al. 2012). They did this by buying insurance contracts known as 
credit default swaps (CDSs) from AIG. By late 2007, as many 
households began defaul4ng on their mortgages, Goldman Sachs 
argued that AIG owed a $5.1bn insurance payout on these 
contracts, based on a probabilis4c es4mate of the underlying 
loans defaul4ng. AIG, however, argued that it owed no more than 
$1.5bn, which allowed it to con4nue recording quarterly profits 
(Ford & Marriage 2018). PricewaterhouseCoopers was the auditor 
for both companies and allowed each firm to record these 
different exposures, even though they were involved in a bilateral 
contract where one company’s gain should equal the other party’s 
loss. This divergent valua4on was only reconciled later when the 
US government agreed to bailout AIG. 
How? 
Deriva4ves like CDSs are ‘level 3’ assets valued on a mark-to-
market basis. However because of their bespoke nature, there is 
olen no external market referent against which values can be 
‘marked’. For this reason values are imputed through proprietary 
economic models, which are sensi4ve to the assump4ons and 
inputs used. The two different es4mates thus emerge from 
differences in the way exposures were calculated. The auditor 
PWC allowed both to be booked ini4ally, although pressure was 
later put on AIG to recognise its obliga4ons.  
Type of Audit Failure 
Rule-stretching/‘calcula%ve inconsistency’. 
References: 
Engelen, E., Ertürk, I., Froud, J., Johal, S., Leaver, A., Moran, M., & 
Williams, K., 2012. Misrule of experts? The financial crisis as elite 
debacle. Economy and Society 41(3), 360-382. 
  
2.9 Frauds like those in Box 1 require a complicit auditor and could happen at any 4me, in 
any country, under any accoun4ng regime. But generally, cases similar to those in Box 4 are 
more complex because auditors may confront a number of compe4ng pressure or 
imponderables. They may confront a hierarchy problem (do you follow Company Law 
principles or the leder of accoun4ng rules?), a threshold problem (have accoun4ng rules 
been broken or merely stretched?), an empowerment problem (even if rules are deemed to 
be stretched not broken, is it correct to exercise judgement in the interest of prudence?), a 
commercial incen4ve problem (will the insistence on greater prudence affect client 
rela4ons?) and an organisa4onal incen4ve problem (will the exercise of judgement affect my 
reputa4on internally?).  
2.10 To take a contemporary example, in 2011 the Thomas Cook parent company released 
£1.46bn of its merger reserve into its retained earnings to account for an impairment to the 
value of its subsidiaries (see Box 5 for a full descrip4on of the case). This effec4vely meant 
releasing unrealised and thus undistributable profits into an account for realised, 
distributable profits. The Thomas Cook parent company then paid out £99.2m as dividends 
which would not have otherwise been legal without this merger reserve release, despite 
recording a loss for the year of £1.52m. The case is salient because:  
a) it implies that a company can increase their distributable reserves because they have 
been financially weakened as a result of a large impairment . In this sense, writedowns 1
which reduce capital maintenance become an opportunity to pay out more dividends, 
further diminishing equity buffers. 
b) Thomas Cook entered liquida4on proceedings in September 2019 aler a goodwill 
writedown could not be absorbed by its equity buffers, and creditors could not reach 
agreement on a refinancing package. 
2.11 This raises a number of issues for an auditor. The 2006 Companies Act is given as the 
ra4onale for the treatment of the impairment, but the Act does not men4on ‘merger 
reserves’ at all. Paragraph 612 refers to merger relief from the share premium account; but it 
does not outline a process for releasing merger reserves into distributable retained earnings. 
The Companies Act does outline a process for releasing reserves from the share premium 
account (another undistributable reserve) into retained earnings, but the bar is high: for a 
public company it requires a special resolu4on, 75% support in a vote by the membership, 
and court approval. However, the ICAEW (2010) 02/17BL technical guidance on merger 
reserves and distribu4ons suggests this treatment of merger reserves is legi4mate and there 
is no men4on of the need for special resolu4ons and court approval (para 39 f (iv)). 
2.12 There is thus an ambiguity or tension between the principle of capital maintenance 
enshrined in the Companies Act and the ac4ons of Thomas Cook which nevertheless appear 
to be consistent with ICAEW guidelines. How should auditors act in such a situa4on? Should 
they follow the principle of company law and exercise judgement to encourage prudence, or 
 Distribu%ons can only be made from “profits available for the purpose”, those being “accumulated, realised 1
profits... less accumulated realised losses” (Companies Act 2006). Distributable reserves set the legal limit on 
what can be distributed.
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should they follow accoun4ng rules strictly and allow a substan4ally weakened company to 
convert unrealised profits into realised profits to pay out a dividend? Hierarchy, threshold, 
empowerment, commercial and organisa4onal factors all apply in such circumstances.  
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BOX 5 
In 2011 the Thomas Cook parent company (Thomas Cook Group PLC) took a £1.43bn impairment to the value of its subsidiaries, resul4ng in an 
overall loss for the year of £1.52bn. That loss was a problem because it meant the parent had to take an equivalent reduc4on on the liability side 
because of the double entry principle. At that point in 4me the parent company had retained earnings of just £199.2m, which would have put 
their retained earnings at -£1.32bn, excluding other adjustments. The Thomas Cook parent avoided repor4ng nega4ve retained earnings using 
two mechanisms (see ‘Company statement of changes in equity’ for reference):  
i) they 'released' £1.46bn of their merger reserve, which is an undistributable reserve into their retained earnings, which is a 
distributable reserve. They claimed, ‘following the impairment of the Company’s investment in subsidiaries during the year, the 
Company has, in accordance the Companies Act 2006, relieved the impairment loss through a transfer from the merger reserve to 
retained earnings’ (Thomas Cook 2011, p.130). The report to the audit commidee noted this treatment is ‘consistent with that 
adopted by other listed Groups’ (p.8). Other groups using this accoun4ng treatment – e.g. Greene King in 2010, DSG Interna4onal in 
2010, J Sainsbury in 2010 – refer to para.612 of that act in jus4fica4on (Company Repor4ng 2011). 
ii) the parent company received £402.9m dividends from their subsidiaries, whilst simultaneously increasing its loans to those 
subsidiaries by £386.8m. 
Those two adjustments increased distributable reserves at the Thomas Cook parent from £199.2m to a level where they could afford to pay a 
£99.2m dividend in 2011 and s4ll have £446.8m of distributable reserves lel over, despite repor4ng a £1.52bn loss for the year.  
 
Company Repor4ng, 2011. Emerging Issues: Share Premium And Elimina4on Of Authorised Capital. hdps://www.companyrepor4ng.com/sites/
default/files/emerging-issues/11.01-share-premium-authorised-capital.pdf 
Thomas Cook 2011. Annual Report. 
2.13 This example raises ques4ons about the organisa4onal and ins4tu4onal context within 
which audit prac4ce is conducted and how this may create opportunity spaces for audit 
failure. This focus helps us to understand the unevenness of audit failures. IFRS was adopted 
across Europe in 2005, yet examples of rule-stretching appear on the surface to be more 
common in the UK. Similarly, accountability problems cannot be explained by audit market 
concentra4on in isola4on because the Big Four are also dominant in countries with lower 
levels of audit failure. This could, for example, reflect differences in board composi4on 
where greater staff or union representa4on may introduce dissen4ng voices that act as a 
check on managerial rule-stretching. It is important therefore to focus on the embeddedness 
of the Big Four within na4onal regulatory structures, corporate governance regimes, market 
dynamics and accoun4ng rules to beder understand the UK’s par4cular vulnerability to audit 
failure. All of these factors compose the opportunity space within which audit failure 
proliferates. 
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3. Explana%ons of Audit Failure 
3.1 To beder understand the problem of public accountability in the audit industry, we 
sought opinions from academics, journalists, civil society representa4ves, regulators and 
industry/ex-industry figures. We conducted 14 semi-structured interviews, each between 40 
minutes and an hour long, asking a standard set of ques4ons which we provide in the 
Appendix.  
3.2 This chapter is an adempt to understand why the UK is so prone to audit failure by 
examining the par4cular way accoun4ng standards, corporate governance incen4ves and 
regula4ons interact in the UK case to create opportunity spaces for weak audi4ng prac4ce. 
We subdivide this analysis into two sec4ons: the first focuses on the ‘lost mission’ of 
audi4ng, examining the opportunity spaces for unaccountable audit prac4ce when the UK’s 
shareholder value culture meets fair value accoun4ng standards. The second examines 
problems of ins4tu4onal incompleteness when US shareholder-focused accoun4ng regimes 
meet UK light-touch regulatory systems. 
A. Fair Value Accoun%ng Standards and ‘Opportunity Spaces’ For Unaccountable Audits 
3.3 The role or ‘mission’ of audit is plainly described in Sec4on 393 of the 2006 Companies 
Act, which states that: 
  
(1)The directors of a company must not approve accounts for the purposes of this 
Chapter unless they are sa4sfied that they give a true and fair view of the assets, 
liabili4es, financial posi4on and profit or loss— 
(a) in the case of the company's individual accounts, of the company; 
(b) in the case of the company's group accounts, of the undertakings included in 
the consolida4on as a whole, so far as concerns members of the company. 
(2)The auditor of a company in carrying out his func4ons under this Act in rela4on to 
the company's annual accounts must have regard to the directors' duty under 
subsec4on (1). 
3.4 However what cons4tutes a ‘true and fair’ view is the subject of almost existen4al 
debate. It is rarely explicitly defined, and so has the capacity to summon quite different 
understandings of the purpose of accoun4ng and audi4ng. If accoun4ng is understood as a 
‘ra4onally consistent set of principles’ (Walton 1993, p.50) which become codified in rules, 
then true and fair assessments by auditors should assess the extent to which those rules 
have been faithfully adhered to at the aggregate by management (see FRC 2014, for 
example). If accoun4ng is understood as a ‘set of pragma4c responses to measurement 
problems’ (Walton 1993, p.50), then auditor assessments of true and fair are established 
through the exercise of judgement - a higher objec4ve formed independently of accoun4ng 
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rules (see LAPFF 2015). The tendency to interpret ‘true and fair’ in the former rather than 
the lader is viewed by many interviewees as a core reason audit quality has declined:  
[Audit currently] depends on an architecture of rules around how you calculate what profits a 
business is making. This creates an architecture of yes/no answers about whether rules are 
followed, and has nothing to do with what audits are supposed to be, which is to make 
judgements about the sustainability and real health of the business. So you can have accounts 
presented that show lots of capital for a business that has none at all. And therefore the basic 
func%on of an audit, to give assurance, is confounded, and investors and wider public has no 
knowledge about the business at all. (Interviewee 12) 
3.5 Others argue that auditors' ability to apply the ‘eyeball test’ to dubious management 
es4mates have been compromised by IFRS accoun4ng rules. They note that IFRS rules have 
reduced auditors' capacity to use judgement and exercise professional scep4cism, crea4ng a 
power imbalance between management and auditors:  
Accounts don’t answer to most stakeholders, since IFRS it’s not answering the most important 
ques%ons. Changes to accoun%ng rules means that accounts have become subjec%ve, 
diminishing the role of the auditor… Unrealized losses go unreported, so profits are 
overes%mated. When the rules say it's OK; then accountants say it's OK. (Interviewee 6) 
The reason why they have lost sight of it is that superimposed on this task is a lot of extraneous 
stuff, irrelevant stuff, the sort of thing that you find with the accoun%ng standards which had 
been designed with a different thing in view, that accounts should give people good 
informa%on on the value of the company… My fundamental concern is that we are seeing 
cases where it’s fairly clear that managers are using the rules and the system to game things 
and to take a very aggressive view… A rules based system is problema%c because a prudent 
auditor might ask to delay the recogni%on of income, but managers say ‘No! This is the rule – 
we are sinng within the standards’. The only op%on the auditor has is to confirm the accounts 
because it is within the rules. Managers shelter behind the rules. (Interviewee 12) 
3.6 Others note a slightly different problem - that the rules themselves are difficult to jus4fy 
on a public accountability basis, and that (some) auditors are unnecessarily beholden to 
them. A broader decline in a culture of challenge is key for some interviewees, one which 
transcends ques4ons of market concentra4on that we discuss later in the report. The 
implica4on is something deeper than an 'expecta4ons gap'. One interviewee implied this 
was a more fundamental problem of accountability – that there is an ‘accountability gap’. For 
example on the principle of ‘going concern’:  
The problem is with accoun%ng standards, they do not relate to the real world. They need to be 
tested against public opinion. For example “foreseeable future” is not 12 months anywhere 
else. If changed to a 5-year defini%on that would already be a huge change (Interviewee 4) 
  
18
3.7 The claim that fair value accoun4ng leads to audit failure gains some support from our 
analysis in sec4on 2; the shil from historic cost to fair value does seem to coincide with a 
greater incidence of audit failure. Even in some of those large failures before 2005, when 
IFRS was adopted across the European Union, fair value was a cause. Enron’s valua4ons of its 
contract profits and deriva4ves valua4ons were, for example, made on a mark-to-market 
basis (Giroux 2008). 
3.8 It is worth no4ng some dissen4ng voices to this argument. Some point to the role of IFRS 
in standardising repor4ng across countries, and the improvement this should make to the 
task of audit. Standardisa4on allows auditors to compile the group and parent accounts of 
complex mul4na4onals with mul4-jurisdic4onal subsidiaries more easily and accurately, thus 
improving the audit func4on (Interviewee 8). Others note that the ul4mate client of the 
audit are the shareholders, and that shareholders require forward looking informa4on which 
auditors should assess robustly. If there is a problem with the audit process, then new 
mechanisms should be sought to improve accountability by making Big Four partners more 
responsible for weak audits or by improving compe44on in the audit market (Interviewee 2). 
A third view maintained that fair value was part of the solu4on because banks and other 
financial services firms could game historic cost accoun4ng by holding deriva4ves at their 
transac4on value even though market prices suggested they were worthless. Auditors just 
needed to enforce those rules more robustly (Interviewee 1).  
3.9 The rela4on between audit quality and accoun4ng standards is therefore not clear cut. 
On balance, it could be said the emphasis on the consistency afforded by IFRS is overstated 
when there is considerable discre4on and subjec4vity involved in the compila4on of 
accounts on a fair value basis which leads to variance. Similarly, although accoun4ng rules 
may try to standardise, those rules are olen differently interpreted and applied in different 
na4onal or organisa4onal contexts; they are refracted through ins4tu4ons and the cultures 
they nurture. It could also be said that forward looking informa4on means lidle to 
shareholders or other stakeholders if it is too open to manipula4on by managers who are 
themselves responding to perverse organisa4onal incen4ves. 
3.10 This emphasises the importance of avoiding mono-causal explana4ons, and instead 
iden4fying how different elements interact to create the opportunity spaces within which 
audit failures are more likely to occur. In the UK case there is a risk of unwanted ins%tu%onal 
isomorphism when board remunera4on is linked to short term shareholder value crea4on 
and IFRS rules provide room for discre4on in the repor4ng of those items which underlie 
shareholder value crea4on. The two have the capacity to reinforce each other if shareholder 
value crea4on becomes both an incen4ve for, and outcome of, poor accoun4ng prac4ce, 
unless checked by auditors exercising judgement.  
3.11 However auditors olen perceive the adherence to IFRS rules as the best way to 
evaluate ‘true and fair’ representa4ons. Feedback from ex-auditors in our interviews 
suggests this creates an ambiguity about where rules end and judgment begins, which can 
lead auditors to defer to managements’ presenta4ons. This can lead to a circularity which 
allows poor accoun4ng prac4ce to flourish. The risk is that the isomorphism of shareholder 
value pressures, remunera4on structures, repor4ng discre4on and audit role ambiguity is 
poten4ally one source of the opportunity spaces which diminish accountability. Serious 
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considera%on should be given to the way audit becomes compromised when fair value 
measurement discre%on meets UK shareholder value corporate governance.  
3.12 Cri4cs could point to the role of historic cost accoun4ng in other scandals, such as the 
Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis which involved avoiding the booking of losses on underwater 
assets (see Young 1995 for discussion). Others could point to the con4nued use of GAAP in 
the US where audit scandals are s4ll commonplace. More research is needed to examine the 
role of fair value accoun4ng on audit failure, in par4cular whether IFRS rules hand 
management too much discre%on in the repor4ng of accoun4ng items; whilst also 
encouraging an over-proceduralisa4on of the audit process at the expense of auditor 
judgement, crea4ng a circular logic - that true and fair assessments of company accounts 
produced within IFRS rules, are judged on the extent to which they comply with those rules. 
Whatever conclusion that research draws, it is impera4ve in principle that IFRS rules are 
subordinate to Company Law, and thus that auditor judgement can override accoun4ng 
rules. This point was raised by BEIS (2019, p. 24): 
Because accounts are prepared in accordance with accoun%ng standards, and auditors review 
the accounts against these standards, the Companies Act 2006 requirements are not 
necessarily met - a case of company law following standards, rather than the other way round. 
B. Ins%tu%onal incompleteness: US rules without US enforcement 
3.13 The lost ‘mission’ of audi4ng has also been adributed to regulatory failure. One concern 
raised by some of our interviewees was that the UK regulator lacks the willingness or ability 
to enforce those rules when they are abused.  
3.14 The limits of the UK’s current regulator, the Financial Repor4ng Council (FRC), were 
noted in both in the BEIS (2019) Future of Audit report, and was the specific focus of the 
Kingman Review (2019). The Kingman review provides a far-reaching cri4que of the remit 
and prac4ces of the FRC. The report cri4cised the FRC’s ‘excessively consensual 
approach’ (p.8) and ‘perceived closeness to those it regulates, its reliance on recrui4ng from 
the major audit firms, and an associated concern that the FRC has an ingrained cultural 
sympathy towards the accoun4ng profession’ (p. 52).  
3.15 Kingman advocates the establishment of a new public regulator to replace the FRC: the 
Audit, Repor4ng and Governance Authority (ARGA). It would have a clear statutory base, 
enhanced enforcement powers, lines of accountability to parliament, and funding via a 
statutory, rather than voluntary levy (p. 60).  
3.16 We agree that voluntary funding arrangements are unlikely to produce a sufficiently 
robust regulatory rela4onship; and that revolving doors between the Big Four and the 
regulator should be countered with re-tooled, formal recruitment procedures. We also 
endorse a shil from procedural-ist verifica4on to professional judgement via an enhanced 
market intelligence func4on, upgraded viability tests and graduated findings, with the lader 
providing room for the expression of auditor opinion on management es4mates and 
judgements in accounts, and a venue for the communica4on of the ra4onale for audit 
outcomes (p. 52).  
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3.17 However, we are concerned that the UK’s problems emerge out of a form of 
ins%tu%onal dissonance that may not be resolved by a Kingman-like proposal. In many ways 
the current regulatory structure is reminiscent of the legacy of ‘club government’ described 
by Moran (2003) - a less rule bound, more consensual approach which relies on discussion 
within trusted networks to ensure best prac4ces are followed. The UK therefore has 
something of a hybrid system where the different parts do not work well in tandem: UK 
regulatory systems are generally more qualita4ve and informal, which means the UK has 
tried to accommodate the US rule-bound proceduralism of fair value accoun4ng standards 
without the US rule-focused regulatory governance approach. This can reinforce the 
tendency outlined in 3.11 for there to be ambiguity at regulatory (and auditor) level as to 
where rules should end and judgment begins. This can be disempowering, encouraging 
uncertainty and thus a more conciliatory approach which can lead auditors and regulators to 
defer to management. As Interviewee 9 put it, this is ‘the worst of both worlds’. 
3.18 The US system, in contrast, has greater symmetry between its accoun4ng framework 
and regulatory architecture. It operates a stronger rules-based regulatory approach where 
good and bad prac4ce are determined by formula which make the division clearer; with less 
ambiguity. That has not stopped malprac4ce, but may have encouraged a more stringent 
approach to failures. En44es like the Public Company Accoun4ng Oversight Board (PCAOB), 
Securi4es and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora4on 
(FDIC) in finance are beder resourced and possess greater statutory powers to sanc4on poor 
auditors. The lesson here is not necessarily to ‘be more like the US’, but rather to think about 
the ins4tu4onal complementari4es between accoun4ng standards, regulatory structures 
and audit purpose/auditor role which reduce opportunity spaces for audit failure. That may 
imply changing accoun4ng rules to empower the exercise of prudence and judgement which 
beder fit our system, rather than conforming with US regulatory structures. 
3.19 These problems of ins4tu4onal dissonance emerge in our interviews with European 
actors. While the UK has previously been seen as a good model, reform efforts in other 
European countries are now looking in different direc4ons.  
The UK market is regulated fundamentally the same as in the EU but obviously there are 
differences. The funny thing is we always looked at the UK as a fairly well regulated market and 
now this has all been put into ques%on. When we looked at the FRC and how they dealt with 
audit regula%on, we looked at it as a model, now we have to change that. That’s apparently 
not what we should have thought. But it is s%ll one of the best performing regulators in Europe, 
maybe that says something about what needs to be done in other countries… the whole focus 
[of reform]  in the Netherlands is on audit quality, and the UK are much more focused on audit 
market. Although the issues may be similar, the way people look at them are different and 
poten%ally the solu%ons are different. The solu%ons in the UK are market driven, in the 
Netherlands the issues they have already made were more focused on remunera%on of 
partners, focusing on quality and linking that to remunera%on and have this accountability 
much beser fleshed out. (Interviewee 5) 
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4. Role of The Big Four in Audit Failure 
4.1 Poor audit prac4ces thrive when organisa4onal and ins4tu4onal incen4ves are 
misaligned with the public interest. It is therefore important to consider the rela4on 
between the market dominance of the Big Four accoun4ng firms and the opportunity spaces 
for audit failure that have been observed recently.  
Market Dominance 
4.2 By any reasonable measure the Big Four are highly concentrated and wield market 
power. The Big Four are not only the largest players in the audit market, but dominate the 
lucra4ve audits of larger firms. Of the S&P500 the Big Four audit 495 companies. Adding 
their other services, their rela4onships with the largest firms are even more comprehensive. 
For illustra4on, PwC publishes how many firms out of different company indices they service. 
Of the FTSE100, PwC service 60% with non-audit work and audit 30 % - leaving just 10% of 
companies with which they have no commercial rela4onship. For S&P Europe the 
breakdown is 59% non-audit, 34% audit, and just 7% with no rela4onship. The padern is 
replicated for the other three firms. The Big Four have strong consul4ng or audi4ng 
rela4onships with almost all of the largest companies in the world – a point raised by a 
number of interviewees.  
Big Four are an oligopoly and they are extremely big and extremely powerful, and they are 
commercial organiza%ons primarily even though as auditors they have regulatory 
responsibili%es and du%es, they are extremely conflicted in terms of their interests. The partner 
incen%ves and culture of these organiza%ons is a real problem in my view. (Interviewee 10) 
4.3 This dominance generates large profits, par4cularly from non-audit service lines. The 
global revenue for these firms varies from USD 29 billion to USD 46 billion for the latest fiscal 
year (PwC 2019, KPMG 2018, EY 2018, Deloide 2019). Audi4ng work represents about a 
third of income for the Big Four. The more lucra4ve ac4vi4es are tax consul4ng, advisory and 
business consul4ng.  
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Figure 5: Big Four Revenue, US$bn, 2018  
Source: Company Accounts, 2018 
4.4 Globally, the Big Four employ over a million people. In EY and PwC, more than half of 
employees are in non-audit service lines. However, an es4mate from 2017 suggests that 
within Europe, the Big Four employ 64,789 people in the UK and 209,554 in the rest of 
Europe.  The UK has the largest concentra4on of Big Four employees (Murphy and 
Stausholm 2017). Their size in the UK is several 4mes bigger than any other country in 
Europe, and almost twice as large as in Germany, their second largest na4onal market.  
4.5 However, it is important to consider whether audit failure problems result from market 
concentra4on or reflect ins4tu4onal problems about organiza4onal incen4ves and culture. 
This raises a fundamental ques4on: have the Big Four shaped the culture of audi4ng through 
their dominance, or have they emerged from, and merely ins4tu4onalised, a longer-standing 
culture that preceded them? The former presumes that market interven4ons can provide 
resolu4on - that breaking up the compe44ve grip of the Big Four would lead to a 
transformed audit sector; the lader requires a more complex considera4on about the place 
of audi4ng within the Big Four and the mechanisms and architectures required to usher in a 
more publicly accountable audit sector. 
Historical Development 
4.6 It is important to avoid teleology. Understanding the rise of the Big four in historical 
context is essen4al. This does not imply that the current levels of concentra4on in the 
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industry are somehow unavoidable, that there was no other historical path the industry 
could have taken (Carruthers and Espeland 1991). It is possible to acknowledge path 
dependency whilst also recognising that paths are always shaped by the topologies they 
confront. Paths can also be diverted, split or even stopped. Hence, to understand the power 
of the Big Four now, we must understand its history, whilst also accep4ng that change is s4ll 
a mader of will and mobilisa4on. 
4.7 The history of audit is rela4vely well known. Audit dates back to medieval 4mes, but only 
came into prominence as trading and manufacturing companies mul4plied in the eighteenth 
century. In the nineteenth century, industrializa4on created the need for financing, which in 
turn created a need for incorpora4on. Incorpora4on created the need for financial repor4ng 
verified through the process of audit (Madhews 2006): compulsory audits were introduced 
in the 1844 Companies Act, scrapped by the 1856 act, then re-established in the 1900 
Companies Act (Wads & Zimmerman 1983). 
4.8 It is also well known that accountants were core to the development of audi4ng, 
assuming professional control over the audit role. This was not pre-determined: there were 
other agents who performed audits in the 19th century, most notably shareholder auditors. 
However, through the development of more extensive techniques, full service provisioning, 
and by professionalising, chartered accountants displaced shareholder auditors as the 
primary actors in the audi4ng sector (Jones 1995). This dominance was consolidated through 
the forma4on of the Ins4tute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) in 
1880, their professional body which represents their interests (Madhews et al. 1998: 60). 
Recurring access to audit work underpinned the growth of the UK accountancy profession 
and its claims to independence in the exercise of professional prac4ce (Sikka and Willmod 
1995). 
4.9 The close rela4ons between audit and non-audit services such as consul4ng long 
predates the emergence of four large accoun4ng firms. However, the firms that now 
cons4tute the Big Four are embedded in this par4cular history. For example, public 
accountants like William Deloide made their name in the mid to late 1800s by providing 
both audi4ng and advisory/ accoun4ng services to railway companies, helping develop 
alterna4ve accoun4ng systems aler large frauds had taken place (Jones 1984: 58). This norm 
is deeply ins4tu4onalised. Many founding fathers of the Big Four firms were also presidents 
of the ICAEW in the late 19th and early 20th Century, including Arthur Cooper, Frederick 
Whinney, William Deloide and Sir William Peat. The proximity of accoun4ng and audi4ng 
func4ons is thus an outcome of a historical ins4tu4onal process which the Big Four have 
shaped and been shaped by. 
    
4.10 There has always been unease about the proximity between accoun4ng and audi4ng 
func4ons da4ng back to the 19th Century, and an expecta4on that there should be a clear 
separa4on between the responsibili4es of the manager to prepare the accounts and 
auditors to verify them. Subsequent Companies Acts formalised this demarca4on: they 
prescribe a clear dis4nc4on between the directors’ responsibility to produce a balance sheet 
and the auditors’ job to give an opinion on it (Edwards and Webb 1985: 177).  
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4.11 The challenge of keeping audit and non-audit ac4vi4es separate is iden4fied as an 
enduring problem; as are the conflict of interests that arise when the financial incen4ve to 
maintain good client rela4ons meets the public interest responsibility to challenge 
management presenta4ons robustly. But these issues are ins4tu4onalised and long predate 
the current compe44ve environment (Suddaby and Greenwood 2006). Cri4cal work on the 
audi4ng industry, for example, illustrates long standing conflicts of interest, despite the 
presence of greater compe44on. These conflicts are a constant, whether we look at the Big 
Four, the Five Brothers pre-Enron (NEF 2002) or the Big Eight of the 1980s (Brooks 2018). For 
example, this was the conclusion of the 1976 Commidee on Government Opera4ons, United 
States Senate, which is worth quo4ng at length: 
This study finds that public doubts concerning the performance of independent auditors of 
major corpora%ons are well founded. Moreover, the problems causing an erosion of confidence 
in the “Big Eight” accoun%ng firms and other independent auditors are inherent in their present 
system of prac%ce, the procedure by which they are chosen, and their rela%onship to standard-
senng bodies. Restora%on of public confidence in the independence and competence of such 
auditors depends upon reforming the manner in which they perform their responsibili%es.  
The most important requirement of independent auditors is that they be regarded by the public 
as truly independent from the interests of their clients. The “Big Eight” firms have seriously 
impaired their independence by becoming involved in the business affairs of their corporate 
clients, and by advoca%ng their clients’ interests on controversial issues. It appears that the 
“Big Eight” firms are more concerned with serving the interests of corporate managements 
who select them and authorize their fees than with protec%ng the interests of the public, for 
whose benefit Congress established the posi%on of independent auditor.  
The management advisory services provided by “Big Eight” firms are intended to aid corporate 
managements in opera%ng their businesses, and necessarily involve “Big Eight” firms in the 
business affairs of their clients. Such involvement creates a professional and financial interest 
by the independent auditor in a client’s affairs which is inconsistent with the auditor’s 
responsibility to remain independent in facts and in appearance’. (Commidee on 
Government Opera4ons, United States Senate, December 1976, p.7)  
4.12 The historical analysis and quote above suggest that market-based solu4ons – the 
introduc4on of more compe4tors – are unlikely to resolve problems of culture and prac4ce 
that are historically and ins4tu4onally engrained. Market concentra4on certainly does create 
problems on market-based terms. For example, in some circumstances the choice of auditor 
is reduced to one if a firm has bought par4cular non-audit services from three of the Big 
Four companies (Interviewee 2). However, the majority of interviewees were scep4cal that 
‘more compe44on’ would solve the more central problem of audit failure: 
Fundamentally the problem [of audit] is insufficient scep%cism, which is about culture, rather 
than compe%%on or the integra%on of firms (Interviewee 4) 
Most focused instead on the partnership system and the incompa4ble cultures of audit and 
non-audit.  
The Partnership System & Organisa%onal Culture 
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4.13 Non-audit services accounted for 79 per cent of the Big Four’s total revenues in 2018, 
and the percentage of profits was even higher (BEIS 2019). Non-audit profits therefore flow 
into the bonus pool of audit partners, who receive a share of the overall profits of the firm. 
This creates incen4ves for audit partners to care more about firm performance at the 
aggregate, the majority of which comes from non-audit services (CMA 2019).  
4.14 This general incen4ve needs to be understood in the context of the overall legal status 
and partner-driven business model of the Big Four firm. Partners are paid on a profit share 
basis. However, since the Limited Liability Partnerships Act (2000), the partnership model 
has changed from one where each individual partner was jointly and severally liable for 
claims against the partnership, to one where the corporate en4ty is granted limited liability 
privileges, reducing the individual exposure of partners to their capital contribu4on to the 
firm (Compe44on Commission 2011). According to the Compe44on Commission (2011) 
report on liability, insurance and sedlements, the Big Four then use ‘cap4ve’ (i.e. in-house) 
insurers, with the risk partly or wholly reinsured in the commercial market, to mi4gate 
negligence claims. This creates, as Richard Brooks observes, the condi4ons for ‘sports-star 
level incomes for men and women… taking no personal or entrepreneurial risk’ (Brooks, 
2018, p.8). Last year Deloide’s 699 UK partners took home an average of £882,000 each. In 
2018, PwC’s UK partners received an average of £712,000, EY’s UK partners an average of 
£693,000, and KPMG’s UK partners an average of £601,000 (Kinder 2019). 
4.15 In a context of limited liability protec4on where audit is compulsory for virtually all 
companies and non-audit services are prac4cally essen4al for any firm of modest size, the 
partnership system may assume a ren4er-like structure. Partners secure high incomes by 
exercising a form of organisa4onal closure, levering the efforts of an ever larger Big Four 
workforce: average partner share of aggregate employment at KPMG, Deloide and PWC  2
declined from 5.56 per cent in 2010 to 4.43 per cent in 2019 (figure 6). The risk is that this 
creates perverse incen4ves for aspirant juniors in audit roles who may wish to be partner at 
some future point. Audit may be compromised in a context where partner profits derive 
largely from non-audit services, and exis4ng partners exercise organisa4onal closure over 
future partner posi4ons.  
 We could not put together a consistent dataset for EY’s partners, hence they are excluded from this 2
calcula4on
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Figure 6: Number Of Partners As A Percentage Of The Total Workforce 2010-2019 (EY 
2017-2019) 
Source: Sta%sta Database 
4.16 These ins4tu4onal pressures may mean that the culture of audit  - which should be 
objec4ve, scep4cal, prudent, and confronta4onal when required is compromised by or 
subordinated to the culture of consul4ng - which is client-focused, pragma4c and ‘can-
do’ (BEIS 2019) in order to maintain good client rela4ons. Ex-auditors or those working 
closely with the industry explained how this client-focused culture seeped into the audi4ng 
process: 
If my client (audit) doesn’t go well, ..; even though there is not technically a reason to say they 
might have a going concern issue, but longer term you cannot convince yourself they will make 
it, … the auditor has a very difficult %me to say to a client “I will consider you not as a going 
concern”. That is an absolute clash with your clients (interests). (Interviewee 5) 
4.17 Under such circumstances, some ques4on the extent to which professional norms 
which have tradi4onally governed the prac4ce are currently working as they should: 
Professional norms are wholly unsa%sfactory (Interviewee 4) 
There is a culture of familiarity. They have forgosen how not to have too close rela%onships, 
and take clients wining and dining instead. (Interviewee 6) 
The awareness within the profession that it is definitely not only about serving the interests of 
your clients has grown. And it is con%nuing to grow. I am not saying it is where this should be 
but it has changed and I think it has changed in the right direc%on… Is the profession able to 
keep up as the wider public or civil society would wish? Poten%ally not, but I think there is more 
and more thinking about it. They are, more and more, trying to do this. But they seem to 
always be a lisle behind. and it is something that is difficult to actually grasp because I would 
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say there are a lot of conflic%ng asks of the profession, and it is also linked to accountability 
and quality - there is a clear link. (Interviewee 5) 
4.18 It should be noted that some respondents saw this as a problem of individual auditors, 
rather than being solely related to the internal culture or market power of the Big Four: 
There will always be audit failures because there are always things that go wrong. Everybody 
makes misjudgements, but some%mes people are also poten%ally not doing the right thing. 
(Interviewee 5)  
Financial instruments have been extremely innova%ve in the last three decades, driven partly 
by regulatory arbitrage… (but) Carillon, Thomas Cook, Pa%sserie Valerie were not complicated 
financial products, it’s just that the auditors did not do a good job. (Interviewee 10) 
4.19 However most highlighted organisa4onal problems, specifically the denigra4on of the 
status of audit as an ac4vity and occupa4on within the average Big Four company:  
In a fundamental way audit is not in the interest to the Big Four firms. They are interested in 
audit as a foot in the door to the boardroom and a regular income. But this idea of challenge or 
scep%cism, there is so much evidence of failure of this. Audit has become a very friendly 
enterprise, not a challenging one at all. (Interviewee 10) 
Too few people see audit work as a career, it’s a stepping stone for a beser paid job. 
(Interviewee 7) 
4.20 Finally, others highlighted the poli4cal clout of the Big Four, and the strong links 
between them and policymakers:  
Big four are enormously powerful in policy making implementa%on and they tend to bring an 
ideological side to that, so they promote both their own interests and the interests of their 
clients, and the type of elite financial capitalism that serves as crea%ng a bigger market for 
them – there is an indirect conflict of interest to them. They are feeding their longer term 
interest. We know that all sorts of corporate sectors are very effec%ve lobbyists, big pharma or 
tobacco etc. … a type of “insider lobbying” (Interviewee 13) 
Governments increasingly depend on the Big Four for consul%ng. They are advising not just on 
comple%ng audits, but also how to do audit, which means there is a conflict in the advice they 
give and the func%on they execute. We also see this with tax loopholes.  (Interviewee 3) 
4.21 In terms of what should be done, some felt that client-based conflicts of interest meant 
that other actors should appoint auditors:  
'Insurers should appoint auditors' (Interviewee 9).  
Others thought there were pros and cons to increasing interven4on in the commissioning 
process:  
Changing the commissioning of the audit seems like a blunt instrument, what if you get a too 
small or a bad auditor? …(However) auditors of local government asked difficult ques%ons 
when they were appointed by the Audit Commission for example. (Interviewee 4) 
Some suggested the greater problem was partner liability: 
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The inven%on of limited liability partnerships means they can think “How much do we have to 
bother” (Interviewee 4) 
Greater clarity is needed on the role of audits, who they serve, to whom auditors are 
accountable and liable when things go wrong, and what consequences they face in such 
circumstances -- the absence of skin in the game (for example, in the form of unlimited liability) 
means that penal%es are o{en minimal due to the difficulty involved in proving a failure of duty 
of care (Interviewee 7) 
4.22 There was some disagreement about whether the state or the market should moderate 
these pressures. Some interviewees believed the main problem was moral hazard which 
could be beder resolved by making partners liable for weak audits. Emphasis here was 
placed on the introduc4on of limited liability in the Big Four and how this distorted 
incen4ves:  
Tradi%onally Big Four were partnerships with unlimited liability. Now, that liability is limited. So 
that has significant influence on the culture of the firm and on the antude and behaviour of 
audit partners. We also know insurance partners are unwilling to provide professional 
indemnity to audit partners, so they are self-insured. There is no way of establishing exactly 
how, but my research shows it is though buying into the poli%cal process and having enough 
poli%cal connec%ons to make sure in the event of scandal they do not get sued. (Interviewee 
10) 
4.23 On a similar tack, others suggested fining partners individually for poor audits 
(Interviewee 13). Ramanna (2019), in his report on how to reinvigorate a culture of challenge 
in audi4ng advocates the use of independent, external remunera4on commidees to more 
robustly intervene on partner bonuses, to make partners more accountable for audit failure. 
29
5. The Role of Civil Society 
5.1 The concerns about audit failure raised by recent government reports detail mul4ple 
sugges4ons for deep, structural reform of the audi4ng sector. Such demands are not new. 
There have been mul4ple adempts to reform the audit market. Calls for reform followed 
corporate failures in the 1930s (Royal Mail Steam Packet Company), 1970s (London and 
Country), 1980s (DeLorean), 1990s (Barings Bank) and 2000s (Enron, great financial crisis). 
These calls all highlighted repeated problems about auditor independence, compe44on, 
governance and regula4on (BEIS 2019). Despite repeat failures, these problems persist. 
5.2 Why do these problems persist and why is effec4ve reform so difficult to achieve? One 
persuasive answer is that audit reform is a ‘thin poli4cal market’ (Ramanna 2015), 
characterised by: i. incumbents’ tacit or implicit knowledge of technical detail, generated by 
experience, so that there is a coalescence of interests and arcane exper4se in the bodies 
involved in the reform process and ii. a generally low poli4cal salience of these issues with 
the general public. These condi4ons make regulatory capture more likely, and also allow big 
players (or special-interest groups) to capture reform processes.  
5.3 The “thin poli4cal market” problem can be seen in the background documents to public 
consulta4ons which emphasise the lack of civil society input into the audit reform process. 
The charts below (figures 7-9) show the categories and numbers of respondents to Financial 
Repor4ng Council public consulta4ons, detailing the last three consulta4ons under the 
category of ‘audit’ to which the FRC received responses. 
5.4 The dominance of the audit profession in discussions of audit reform and regula4on is 
notable. The second most dominant group are users of financial statements, those who 
commit capital to firms. The third are preparers of financial statements. Academia has 
minimal presence and public authority voices are few and far between. Despite the 
importance of audit as a ‘social u4lity’, voices that inform debate represent a narrow set of 
interests. Civil society is all but absent. 
5.5 The 2019 ‘Revision to Ethical and Audit Standards’ consulta4on addressed the need for 
trust and confidence between the users of audited financial statements and company 
directors. In the same year the ‘Proposed revision to the CASS standard’ consulta4on 
addressed the proposal for revisions to the Client Assets Assurance Standard. This provides 
requirements and guidance for auditors repor4ng to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
on an en4ty’s compliance with FCA’s CASS Rules pertaining to firms that hold or control 
client money or assets. The 2015 ‘Review of UK Audit Firm Governance Code Feedback 
statement and proposed revisions’ invited input on the FRC code which is intended to 
provide a benchmark of good governance prac4ce against which firms that audit listed 
companies can report for the benefit of shareholders. FRC consulta4ons can be accessed 
here: hdps://www.frc.org.uk/actuaries/asorps/past-consulta4ons. 
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Figure 7: Responses to ‘Review of UK Audit Firm Governance Code 
Feedback statement and proposed revisions’ 2015 
 
Figure 8: Responses to ‘Proposed revision to the CASS standard’ 2019 
 
Figure 9: Responses to ‘Revision to Ethical and Audit Standards’ 2019 
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5.6 The lack of diversity in discussions of audit is replicated outside the UK. In 2010 the EU 
published a Green Paper, ‘Audit Policy: Lessons from the crisis’ to invite discussion of a range 
of issues. These included the supervision of the auditors, the structure of the audit market 
and the governance and independence of audit firms. 688 comments were submided with 
407 (59%) coming from the audit profession, 145 from preparers, 22 users, 57 public 
authori4es, 9 audit commidees, 28 academia and 20 categorized as other. The European 
Commission reports that of ‘other’ the majority came from private individuals (EC 2011).  
5.6 Respondents from the UK were more consistent in opposing reform proposals than 
respondents from any other country. Of interest in terms of iden4fying change coali4ons, 
the 213 responses that came from small German auditors and firms strongly supported 
reform proposals (Böcking et al. 2011). Subtrac4ng these respondents from the audit 
profession category shows that large audit firms almost unanimously opposed reform . ‘... 
(M)ost of the stakeholders did not see a necessity for fundamentally changing the status 
quo. This result prevails even more when, in a separate analysis, we treated iden4cal 
statements by several German small prac44oners as a single response’ (Böcking et al. 2011: 
1). Auditors, financial statement preparers and users dominate discussions on audit reform 
in support of the status quo. Civil society is silent. 
5.7 The silence of civil society on the important mader of audit reform is a public 
accountability problem. As Ramanna notes, ‘a rela4vely higher awareness among the public 
of [these issues] induces intermediaries such as poli4cians or the media to act as safeguards 
for the public interest’ (Ramanna 2015, pp.7-8). The challenge is how to energise civil society 
to become involved in the reform process, when for many this is simply a boring, technical 
ac4vity with lidle connec4on to their own lives.  
5.8 The absence of a civil society voice in audit reform and the challenge this poses to public 
accountability was a concern for many interviewees. Some commented that the purpose of 
audit should be reframed to include a wider range of stakeholders, and argued for a civil 
society with capacity to speak for those interests in the reform process.  
Cultural change and pressure is needed. Businesses should be accountable not just to 
shareholders, they should bring externali%es [such as the environment] into accounts. 
(Interviewee 6) 
Company structure and dividend focus is part of the problem. In the UK and US there is 
recent debate (Business Roundtable) about businesses should have a purpose, but this 
hasn’t been given life. Civil society could impact responsible shareholders. (Interviewee 
4) 
It should be a mul% stakeholder consulta%on, everyone in the same room. The profession 
at large is open for that. If the profession could have a method in which they contribute 
and there is discussion. But not new regula%on and new demands every year, it seems to 
be a never ending struggle. (Interviewee 5) 
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Civil society could be publishing, ac%vely promo%ng, ensuring accurate descrip%on. How 
much money are they genng and where from. Influencing public opinion, engaging with 
government and regulators, and independent analysis of the more technical elements. 
Providing a mechanism for young auditors and provide them with a different point of 
view, help them coalesce into a cons%tuency that could be influen%al. An area where 
there is leverage is on graduate intake. There could be a different view presented to 
students on what the firms offer and what their impact is in society, have them think 
about ques%ons to ask in interviews. (Interviewee 13) 
5.9 Interviewees suggest that there are challenges in construc4ng a broader public sphere 
around audit and making the issue a topic of mainstream poli4cal debate. Several suggest 
that one way of making the risk of audit failures clear to the public is to focus on the risk to 
employees.  
It is possible to involve civil society but might be hard to see how – what stakes do civil 
society have in the governance of for example Sports Direct? (Interviewee 3) 
In the case of Thomas Cook, the customers are genng saved, but not employees. This is 
the human face of audi%ng risk. (Interviewee 4) 
All audit stakeholders (employees, creditors, investors) should have a statutory right of 
access to audit files, working papers, etc, and should be able to ques%on the outgoing 
auditors on their statement of circumstances (Interviewee 7)  
5.10 Thickening this thin poli4cal market by involving civil society in the reform processes of 
the audi4ng sector is essen4al. However, improving transparency may be another way to 
provide the public with access to informa4on so that it may beder understand the audit 
process is another. This would allow the public and the press to act as a more effec4ve check 
on or bulwark against conflicts of interest:  
Auditors should be required to fully disclose the full set of rela%ons they have with their 
clients, and to comment on what steps they take to avoid conflicts of interest arising 
between audit and (say) consul%ng advice on an M&A project, or on tax structuring.  A 
statement should be appended to the annual report of a company clarifying all related 
party transac%ons. Outcomes of discussions between outgoing and incoming auditors 
should be filed on public record at Companies House so that all stakeholders have access 
to this informa%on. (Interviewee 7) 
5.11 However this vision of a more ac4ve and effec4ve civil society check on audit failures 
will require the development of new public knowledge and capabili4es which require 
organisa4on.  Civil society ac4vism on audit failure confronts high levels of complexity and 
thus high barriers to entry.  
[Civil society needs] to really understand structure, money flows, everything about the 
firms. Secondly, understand the technical parts of reform proposals. And thirdly 
understand campaigning. Proper strategic insights into developing things that work. 
Smart strategizing… Anyone who has been previously a partner or is on the route to 
being a partner in the Big Four would have a conflict of interest. (Interviewee 13) 
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5.12 Building civil society engagement on issues olen considered boring and technical is 
challenging. Although there are some signs of encouragement. The work of financial 
journalists at the Financial Times have increased the public prominence of this issue through 
their coverage of detailed accoun4ng failures and of Big Four culture, for example. But the 
readership of the FT is rela4vely eclec4c and well-wriden exposes alone will not 
automa4cally lead to civil society momentum on audit issues. That requires organisa4on, 
and the key problem is that there are few organisa4ons campaigning about audit failure.  
5.13 Tax is a case in point. It provides precedent of another campaign issue that was deemed 
arcane and captured by vested interests and technocra4c barriers to entry. Tax jus4ce has 
despite this history of insula4on from public conten4on, increased in salience with new 
regulatory tools such as Country by Country Repor4ng (CbCR) origina4ng in civil society and 
now adopted in policy (Seabrooke and Wigan 2016). The Tax Jus4ce Network has been at the 
fore here and provides some clear pointers on direc4on of travel.  
5.14 Figures 10 and 11, below, provides an issue crawler depic4on of the organiza4onal 
websites involved with tax jus4ce issues for 2012 and 2016. Issue Crawler (issuecrawler.net) 
is a network mapping solware that captures outlinks from specified sites and ‘crawls’ along 
them to establish issue linkage from website presence (Marres and Rogers 2005). It permits 
a visualiza4on of exis4ng links between organiza4ons based on the issue, such as tax jus4ce. 
This technique locates links between websites and is an established method for loca4ng 
agenda se{ng in transna4onal networks (Carpenter et al., 2014). Researchers in this team 
conducted Issue Crawler searches on tax jus4ce issues in 2012 and 2016.  Figures 10 and 11 
show the betweenness centrality of nodes (websites) in the network, with the size of the 
nodes a reflec4on of the number of 4mes it acts as the shortest bridge between two other 
nodes.  
Figure 10: Tax Jus%ce Issue Crawler Network, 2012. 
 
5.15 Figure 10 shows the tax jus4ce issue space in 2012. By this 4me the tax jus4ce issue had 
been well-established and given a significant boost with post-financial crisis moral outrage 
about tax abuses and bailouts. Tax Jus4ce Network had led this charge since 2003 as an 
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informally assembled expert-based NGO (Seabrooke and Wigan 2016).  Tax Jus4ce Network 
(taxjus4ce.net) is located to the southeast of the diagram, and the Financial Ac4on Task 
Force and Chris4an Aid are also prominent towards the center of the image. What is 
interes4ng about this network depic4on is that the nodes doded around taxjus4ce.net are 
4ed together. This includes TJN branches but also different websites that speak to different 
audiences. For example treasureislands.org is a website for a popular 2012 book on tax 
havens wriden by a journalist affiliated with TJN (Shaxson 2012). taxresearch.org.uk is 
Richard Murphy, a key driving force behind CbCR and the FairTax Mark, a prolific blogger on 
economics issues, and now director of the Corporate Accountability Network. 
financialsecrecyindex.com refers to the Financial Secrecy Index produced by TJN and 
affiliates, which provides a unique methodology to measure the extent of financial secrecy 
provided by a jurisdic4on (Cobham et al. 2015). This benchmark is aimed at the 
policymaking community, deliberately seeking to move aden4on away from the idea of ‘tax 
havens’ as tropical des4na4ons ge{ng away with daylight robbery and placing emphasis on 
corporate and elite tax avoidance within the core of the OECD member states (Seabrooke 
and Wigan 2015). In Figure 10 there are some 4es to intergovernmental organiza4ons like 
the Financial Ac4on Task Force, the World Bank, and the UK Department for Interna4onal 
Development, but this network is mainly populated by NGOs, including large players like 
Transparency Interna4onal. At the 4me NGOs were compe4ng for aden4on on the tax 
jus4ce issue and signalling to each other, crea4ng the dense network depicted above. 
Figure 11: Tax Jus%ce Issue Crawler Network, 2016. 
 
5.16 Figure 11 provides the network for 2016. taxjus4ce.net is by far the most dominant 
node. We can see the thinning out of NGOs compared to only four years earlier, but the rise 
of direct 4es to intergovernmental ac4vity, such as with the OECD, the European 
Commission, a range of development banks, and large NGOs like Transparency Interna4onal. 
There are also substan4ve links to groups such as the Public and Commercial Services Union, 
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as well as direct links to journalists (ICIJ). By 2016 it is clear that tax jus4ce issues like CbCR 
had moved from the periphery into formal decision-making circles backed by agents that 
could apply significant public pressure.  
5.17 One known way to create momentum on technical issues is through the crea4on of 
benchmarks and indices. Civil society organiza4ons can engage ‘reformist’ benchmarking by 
calling on experts to assess and analyse prac4ces within accepted industry standards. So 
called ‘expert ac4vists’ can push forward ‘revolu4onary’ benchmarks by offering alterna4ve 
standards against which prac4ces can be assessed. Here one can expect significant 
opposi4on from entrenched interests (Seabrooke and Wigan 2015). Both reformist and 
revolu4onary forms of genera4ng civil society engagement on technical issues have their 
posi4ves and nega4ves. Pursuing audi4ng with accountability requires some similar choices 
to be made on how to best engage ac4vists, authori4es, and broader civil society.  
5.18 The demand for a noisier poli4cs on audit and audit reform is on the rise. While 
demand is growing, ins4tu4onal supply lags. As noted in regard to the poli4cs surrounding 
the City of London and a ‘finance curse’ that the City nourishes (Christensen et al. 2016), 
where ins4tu4onal supply is absent and unlikely to spontaneously emerge, it must be 
strategically and purposively orchestrated (Baker and Wigan 2017). It is important that such 
efforts are not only UK-based but also transna4onal, since professional prac4ces, including 
audi4ng, are developed and affirmed through transna4onal communi4es (Free et al. 2019). 
However, efforts can be seeded in the UK as a prac4cal star4ng point. And reforms in the UK 
may have interna4onal implica4ons, by demonstra4ng what change is possible.  
6.  Recommenda%ons 
6.1 Our examina4on of audit failure and our interviews reveal ongoing concerns about the 
decline of judgement and scep4cism in the audit process, the conflicts of interest between 
consul4ng and audi4ng roles within the Big Four organisa4ons, and – more broadly – the 
loca4on of audi4ng within an architecture of impoverished checks and balances which 
create the opportunity spaces for poor prac4ce. 
6.2 Audit is a social u4lity: it should serve all stakeholders, whether shareholders, creditors, 
employees, suppliers, or consumers. Audit failure therefore is a public accountability failure. 
6.3 Our recommenda4ons are therefore guided by the following principles: 
• The importance of reasser4ng the proper role of audit prac4ce: to exercise judgement 
to ensure that accoun4ng informa4on provides the best approxima4on of underlying 
economic ac4vity.   
• The importance of reinvigora4ng a culture of scep4cism and prudence in the audit 
process 
• The importance of closing down the opportunity spaces where scep4cism may be 
compromised and poor prac4ce may proliferate. 
• The importance of mobilising a civil society bulwark against the thin poli4cal markets 
which lead to insider capture of regula4on and the reform process. 
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With those principles in mind, our recommenda4ons are: 
  
A. In terms of the role of audit: 
  
6.4 We acknowledge the importance of accoun4ng rules as a mechanism for standardising 
repor4ng prac4ce, allowing investors and other stakeholders to make commensurable 
comparisons between firms. But there is a legi4mate concern that the move to IFRS has led 
to an over-proceduralisa4on that has reduced audit to an architecture of yes/no debates 
around whether rules are fulfilled or not. 
6.5 Audit has lost sight of its mission, enshrined in the 2006 Companies Act which is to form 
a judgement about the sustainability and health of a business by providing a true and fair 
view of its assets, liabili4es, financial posi4on and profit or loss. 
6.6 In recent 4mes an ambiguity has emerged, both in the FRC’s (2014) interpreta4on of 
‘true and fair’ (see LAPFF 2015) and in auditors’ own view that their role is to implement 
IFRS rules. It is not. 
6.7 Similarly the concept of prudence was removed from the IFRS 2010 Conceptual 
Framework for financial repor4ng. 
6.8 We therefore recommend a rewri%ng of the accoun%ng framework to ensure greater 
symmetry with the 2006 Companies Act about the role of audi4ng: that whilst rules should 
standardise the process of construc4ng financial reports, the role of audit is to verify them 
by providing a true and fair view of its assets, liabili4es, financial posi4on and profit or loss. 
Accoun4ng rules should be subordinate to the law, and the law demands the exercise of 
independent judgement and professional scep4cism by auditors to encourage prudence. We 
do not want to be overly-prescrip4ve about which body or bodies should be charged with 
this rewri4ng process, but in principle those bodies should be intellectually plural and 
include civil society representa4ves to prevent industry capture.  
  
B. In terms of the culture of audit: 
  
6.9 We recognise that a restatement of the role of audi4ng is a necessary prerequisite for 
changing audit prac4ce, but is unlikely to change prac4ce on its own. 
6.10 Our history of audi4ng has shown that the conduct of audit and audit’s rela4onship to 
other prac4ces are olen shaped by informal rules which play at the edges of what might be 
deemed legi4mate; and that new rules may simply enshrine and legi4mise informal 
behaviours that have been long prac4ced. 
6.11 This has olen led to conflicts of interest between audit and non-audit func4ons when 
those ac4vi4es are carried out within the same organisa4on. 
37
6.12 Such conflicts may also lead to a compromising of audit quality if maintaining a good 
client rela4on with management becomes an important commercial concern. 
6.13 This culture did not start with the Big Four. Similar problems are noted when there were 
‘Five Brothers’ (NEF 2002; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005) or even eight large accoun4ng 
and audit firms (Commidee on Government Opera4ons, United States Senate, December 
1976, p.7) This culture has long structural and ins4tu4onal origins. 
6.14 It is rather the case that the Big Four represents a con4nua4on and consolida4on of 
that culture. For that reason we do not think there to be any natural mechanism through 
which the introduc4on of more compe44on of similarly integrated accoun4ng and audit 
combines would resolve this fundamental cultural problem. 
6.15 However we do believe the culture of scep4cism and challenge necessary to conduct 
robust audits is olen sublimated to the op4mis4c problem-solving culture of consul4ng. 
Auditors must be fearless. And, they are only able to be so if there is a separa4on between 
the two ac4vi4es. We therefore support a structural and legal separa%on of those 
ac%vi%es, rather than a sober governance or opera%onal (ring-fencing) separa%on.  
6.16 We note that this is poli4cally prac4cable. The industry responses given in the BEIS 
(2019) report suggest that many within the Big Four believe this may resolve some of their 
accountability problems, and that this is the direc4on of travel they are moving in, in any 
case. Audit is similarly no longer a major profit centre, and so would be a tolerable loss. We 
also note that some coordina4on will always be required in complex audits, but that this 
could be managed through more sophis4cated informa4on systems.  
6.17 However, we note some risks associated with this separa4on. First, the separa4on of 
low-profit audit services from high profit non-audi4ng services raises legi4mate ques4ons 
about the financial viability of audit post-separa4on. Audit costs will have to rise and those 
costs will likely be passed on to consumers. Second, the risk of capture by clients may be 
more pronounced if the audit market fragments and smaller auditors become dependent on 
a handful of large audit contracts to survive. Third, there may be informa4on asymmetries if 
the audit sector fragments whilst non-audit services remain at their current level of 
concentra4on. 
6.18  On the first risk, there is a strong case that audit failure has now got out of hand and 
that higher audit costs are a social price worth paying for more robust, accountable audits. 
There may be efficiency enhancing outcomes which offset some of these costs (see para 6.33 
below). Similarly, those higher upfront costs should lead to a smaller number of corporate 
failures, the costs of which are, in many cases, already socialised. On the second and third 
risks we believe the ren4er problem outlined in para 4.15 could be ameliorated through the 
withdrawal of limited liability privileges in both audit and non-audit services. That would 
incen4vise prudence in audit and more cau4on in non-audit. Partners are not suppliers of 
risk capital in the classic sense and so it is unclear what purpose limited liability serves other 
than protec4ng partner privilege. Limited liability in this situa4on is a moral hazard that 
helps priva4se gains and socialise losses, and so needs to be withdrawn.  
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6.19 This withdrawal of limited liability privilege should be coupled with Kingman’s 
recommenda4on for an enlarged Audit, Repor%ng and Governance Authority (ARGA) 
which replaces the FRC. This organisa4on should be willing to levy significantly larger fines 
on audit firms who engage in poor audit prac4ce. Fines should be charged to the bonus pool 
and must be significant enough for partners to ‘feel it’ in their pay packets: for example the 
record £15.4m of fines the FRC levied on all Big Four firms in 2018 is less than the pay 
received by just eighteen of Deloide’s 699 UK partners, calculated at the average profit share 
of £882,000 they received. 
6.20 We believe this market-based interven4on is more in-keeping with the fabric of UK 
ins4tu4onal arrangements. But should these interven4ons not work, a more interven4onist 
approach might be necessary. Withdrawing firms’ ability to choose auditors might be 
another step: audit could be financed by an annual levy on firm revenues, with auditors 
allocated by ARGA on 5-7 year contracts - long enough to build knowledge and prevent the 
evic4on of challenging auditors, but short enough to prevent the forma4on of strong social 
4es (see Geiger and Raghunandan 2002 regarding problems of short term audit contracts). 
  
C. In order to shrink opportunity spaces: 
  
6.21 A risk associated with legal separa4on of audit and non-audit is the risk that 
informa4on asymmetries affect auditors’ ability to conduct meaningful audits. If large 
corpora4ons con4nue to work with large non-audit advisory services firms, then a smaller, 
more diffuse audit sector may struggle to engage with the detail of accoun4ng innova4on. 
Similarly, the extrica4on of auditors from the Big Four may encourage an even more 
carnivorous culture to flourish in the firms they leave behind. 
6.22 Our analysis of audit failure suggests that fair value accoun4ng provides a large 
opportunity space for such informa4on asymmetries to emerge. We therefore recommend a 
government review into the role of fair value accoun%ng rules in audit failure. That review 
should consider within its remit whether moving back to historic cost as the legal statutory 
form of repor4ng would vastly simplify the accoun4ng regime, reducing the returns to the 
informa4on asymmetries that can arise under fair value (e.g when using proprietorial 
models to value level 3 assets like deriva4ves). There are legi4mate concerns that the move 
to IFRS has blunted auditor judgement (see, for example, Economic Affairs Commidee 2011, 
para.113), reducing assessments of true and fair to an architecture of 4ck box, yes/no 
discussions about whether IFRS rules have been followed or not. This may lead to an over-
proceduralisa4on of audi4ng which creates an ambiguity as to when rules end and 
judgement begins. This can lead auditors to defer to management’s accoun4ng 
presenta4ons.  
6.23 Auditors should be free to exercise judgement, but judgement would benefit from a 
more verifiable accoun4ng regime with a stronger eviden4al basis. Historic cost may provide 
one crucial way of handing power back to auditors and diminishing returns to the gaming of 
accoun4ng rules in non-audit. This would not stop firms producing fair value accounts if they 
believed it would benefit shareholders. That would be at their discre4on to do so. 
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6.24  The legal separa4on of audit and non-audit ac4vi4es, the removal of limited liability, a 
revivified mission of audi4ng and a review of the impact of fair value on audit quality may 
not of themselves change audit culture, par4cularly if auditors carry the cultures from their 
old employers with them. Currently the FRC lacks the resources, power and authority to 
uphold the mission of audi4ng – that is the conclusion of both Kingman & BEIS reports. This 
is another reason to support the Kingman recommenda4on to introduce a new Audit, 
Repor4ng and Governance Authority (ARGA) regulator. 
  
D. In order to mobilise a civil society bulwark against the thin poli4cal markets 
  
6.25 The Accoun4ng Profession has been described as a ‘state within a state’ (LAPFF 2015, 
p.2). Its basis of authority is narrow, res4ng on mastering an arcane and esoteric language 
and technical skills held by ini4ates. That authority is rarely contested. 
6.26 It is thus important we do not take for granted the ability of the accoun4ng profession 
to wrestle control of the reform process away from public actors. Past adempts to reform 
the industry have failed because they have brought influence over i) problem defini4on ii) 
planning & design of solu4ons iii) implementa4on, in a context where there is lidle 
countervailing force from civil society. 
6.27 This can be explained through the idea that audi4ng is a ‘thin poli4cal 
market’ (Ramanna 2015), characterised by:  
i. incumbents’ tacit or implicit knowledge of technical detail, generated by experience 
ii. a general low salience of these issues with the general public.  
These condi4ons make regulatory capture more likely, and also allow big players (or special-
interest groups) to capture reform processes. Yet, ‘a rela4vely higher awareness among the 
public of this possibility induces intermediaries such as poli4cians or the media to act as 
safeguards for the public interest’. (Ramanna 2015, pp.7-8) 
6.28 Civil society must play a more ac4ve role as a poli4cal agent in applying pressure on 
regulators, auditors, government and other intermediaries to ensure that regula4on is 
accountable and that the reform process is less prone to capture. This will require a 
programme of engagement and educa4on, which draws on the following principles: 
6.28.1 To construct audit as a public interest issue, there needs to be a focal point; so 
that audit becomes a prism through which people understand aspects of their own 
lives. The link between lost jobs, inequality and audit failure needs to be made. 
6.28.2 There also needs to be a stronger public sense of the proper role of audi4ng, as 
the police men/women of the economy, underwri4ng stable jobs. This would be the 
basis from which to ask ques4ons about whether auditors are holding companies to 
account. 
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6.28.3 There also needs to be a basic and accessible poli4cal economy analysis of 
audi4ng. Low poli4cal salience can be combated through a greater public 
understanding of the industry (its structure, role of partners, pay norms, importance of 
consul4ng etc) in order to highlight how it can go wrong. 
6.28.4 The public also require a beder technical understanding of accoun4ng as an 
ac4vity that constructs rather than maps our economy - to emphasise the importance 
of prudence, scep4cism, judgement. 
6.28.5 An understanding of how to mobilise knowledge, to build organised civil society 
bodies that develop internal capacity and external networks 
6.29 In order to do that, there will need to be educa4onal fora, training programmes, idea-
building events etc. The goal would be to create a greater number of ci4zen-intellectuals/
civil society experts. A poli4cal case would be made for their representa4on in the new 
ARGA and in discussions of accoun4ng reform as a civil society check on the problem of thin 
poli4cal markets. 
6.30 This would also require the construc4on of new organisa4ons which act as advocates 
for change and new networks of academic/public intellectuals, seasoned campaigners and 
public representa4ves to act as a check, balance and social force driving the reform process 
through the three stages of problem defini4on, plan/design and implementa4on. 
6.31 Hybrid networks will not emerge in spontaneous response to audit failure; in financial 
markets, for example, failure creates demand but ins4tu4onal supply is not automa4c (Baker 
& Wigan 2017). Civil society ac4vism on complex economic issues requires specific, and 
rela4vely scarce capaci4es. A corporate accountability public sphere calls for strategic 
planning to harness linkages between academia and professionals. New organisa4ons will 
also require resources to pay for the hard gral of advocacy and campaigning. 
6.32 If civil society is to act, there must also be greater transparency, so that a more 
educated, knowledgeable public body may hold the industry to account. Transparency 
featured prominently as one way of building a civil society bulwark, in our interviews: 
When auditors resign they seldom provide clear reasons for their ac%on.  Being taciturn or 
economical with material informa%on prevents stakeholders from understanding the true state 
of a company or enterprise - in some cases it appears that outgoing auditors may withhold 
informa%on from stakeholders at the request of directors / management, which strikes me as a 
derelic%on of duty to stakeholders (Interviewee 7) 
We are seeing the backlash from the Big Four firms [against the proposals from CMA report] so 
we will have to wait and see. They are very powerful organiza%ons who have been capable of 
determining their own regula%on and enforcement for very long. (Interviewee 10) 
6.33 However, all regulatory change should be assessed on the basis that there are financial 
trade-offs. Our recommenda4ons may be norma4vely jus4fied, but may be challenged on 
the new financial costs they would impose. On this we believe more research is needed. The 
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costs of accoun4ng restatements as a result of audit failure stretch into the tens, if not 
hundreds of billions of pounds. But more than that - there is an opportunity cost basis which 
should also be considered in any financial calcula4on. A more publicly accountable audit 
market might have unan4cipated and benign spin-offs. For example, when shareholder 
returns can be generated through accoun4ng manipula4on in ways that exceed those 
expected from produc4ve investment, senior managers may allocate greater 4me and 
resource to the former, olen at the expense of the lader. In other words weak audi4ng may 
encourage ‘sa4sficing’ behaviour in managers, who may switch their efforts from the 
‘difficult’ stuff of improving firm competences to the ‘easy’ stuff of crea4ve accoun4ng. This 
may ‘crowd out’ investment, leading to falling produc4vity. Consequently, more robust 
audits may weed out weak managers who rely on accoun4ng manipula4on and help 
promote more genuinely entrepreneurial managers who are willing to invest and are beder 
able to spot real investment opportuni4es.   
6.34 Returning to our discussion of unwanted ins4tu4onal isomorphism (para.3.10) and 
ins4tu4onal dissonance (para. 3.17), we view these recommenda4ons as ins4tu4onally 
complementary; they would work in a mutually reinforcing way to shrink opportunity 
spaces. The separa4on of audit and non-audit would remove the cultural and commercial 
pressures on auditors to temper their professional scep4cism. Auditors would then be 
guided by a clearer, restated mission for audit to uphold Company Law; whilst the removal of 
limited liability would apply incen4ves to audit partners to ensure that principle was 
adhered to.  All of these processes would mutually reinforce each other, and be overseen by 
and embedded in an enlarged civil society sphere, empowered through increased 
transparency to hold organisa4ons and processes to account. 
Figure 12: Shrinking the Opportunity Spaces for Audit Failure 
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APPENDIX 1: 100 largest audit failures by story frequency in the FT 
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APPENDIX 2: Interview ques%ons 
Accountability challenges  
● what, if any, would you say are the main accountability issues in the sector?  
● what, in your view, are the main causes of some of the audit failures we’ve seen in recent 
years? 
● how unprecedented would you say that the current spate of audit failures (Carillion, 
Pa4sserie Valerie etc), are? 
● do you see these recent cases as isolated incidents, or do you think they highlight a broader 
problem in the audi4ng industry? 
● would you say that problems - when they arise - are concentrated within a par4cular country 
or countries, or are there general/interna4onal problems? (i.e. do they arise only in a 
par4cular na4onal context, or are problems evenly geographically dispersed due to the 
interna4onal footprint of the Big 4 accoun4ng firms) 
● have changes to accoun4ng rules (from historic cost to fair value) increased or decreased 
accountability challenges?  
The Big 4  
● In your view, do the Big 4 do an adequate job of audi4ng large firms? 
● Is market concentra4on demand driven - do large companies require large mul4-func4onal, 
global audi4ng firms to conduct their audit? 
● Would the audi4ng func4on be improved through more compe44on? If so, how could that 
be implemented?  
● Is the concentra4on of the Big 4 in London a problem? If so, how?  
● Are there conflicts of interest between the audi4ng and consul4ng arms of the Big 4 
accoun4ng firms, or do you think those conflicts are overblown?  
● If the former, what is the nature of those conflicts?  
● Are professional norms working as they should, and do they act as a sufficient check 
on conflicts of interest? 
Regula4on 
● Is government regula4on of the audi4ng industry adequate? If not, what do you think should 
change? 
● Is there a sufficient balance between formal regula4on and oversight and self regula4on in 
the sector? 
● Should government or its regulatory agencies try to intervene in the market structure of 
audi4ng?  
● Should government or its regulatory agencies separate the audit and consul4ng func4ons of 
the Big 4? 
● What other reforms could be implemented that might alleviate some of the recent concerns 
about the industry?  
Reform 
● There have been many historic adempts to improve the audi4ng industry: what, in your view 
have been the successes and failures?  
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● Do you think they addressed the most relevant problems and underlying causes?  
● What could be improved, both in terms of design and general approach?  
● What, in your view, have been the most significant obstacles to reform?  
● Which cons4tuents/actors should be involved in the process of reform?  
● Could civil society ini4a4ves play a role in suppor4ng a reform process/could civil society play 
a role in monitoring the industry?  
● If so, what skills or knowledge would a civil society organisa4on need in order to be 
effec4ve in monitoring the industry or challenging its power? 
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